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Modern	  states	  assert	  (or	  assume)	  a	  right	  to	  rule	  not	  only	  particular	  people	  –	  
their	  subjects	  –	  but	  also	  particular	  places	  –	  their	  territory.1	  	  States’	  territorial	  rights	  
are	  typically	  thought	  to	  include	  claims	  to	  control	  over	  people’s	  entry	  into,	  and	  
continued	  presence	  in,	  their	  territory,	  control	  over	  natural	  resources	  located	  within	  
it,	  and	  the	  right	  to	  exercise	  legal	  jurisdiction	  over	  all	  those	  present	  within	  that	  
territory.	  	  My	  focus	  here	  will	  be	  on	  the	  last	  of	  these	  territorial	  rights,	  commonly	  
referred	  to	  as	  the	  right	  to	  territorial	  jurisdiction.2	  	  Specifically,	  I	  propose	  to	  
investigate	  a	  certain	  approach	  to	  justifying	  the	  territorial	  dimension	  of	  a	  state’s	  
political	  authority	  –	  its	  right	  to	  enact,	  apply,	  and	  enforce	  the	  law	  over	  all	  those	  
present	  in	  the	  territory	  it	  claims	  a	  right	  to	  rule	  –	  while	  leaving	  open	  the	  justifiability	  
of	  any	  other	  territorial	  rights	  claimed	  by	  (or	  on	  behalf	  of)	  states.	  	  Indeed,	  I	  will	  not	  
even	  argue	  for	  a	  full	  account	  of	  legitimate	  political	  authority,	  but	  simply	  assume	  a	  
natural	  duty	  or	  functionalist	  account	  so	  that	  I	  can	  consider	  how	  it	  might	  be	  amended	  
or	  extended	  in	  order	  to	  justify	  states’	  jurisdiction	  over	  specific	  geographical	  places.3	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Indeed,	  at	  least	  in	  those	  states,	  like	  the	  U.S.,	  that	  grant	  citizenship	  to	  anyone	  born	  in	  their	  territory,	  
the	  latter	  claim	  informs	  the	  former.	  
2	  See	  Anna	  Stilz,	  ‘Nations,	  States,	  and	  Territory,’	  Ethics	  121:3	  (2011):	  573;	  David	  Miller,	  ‘Territorial	  
Rights:	  Concept	  and	  Justification,’	  253;	  A.	  John	  Simmons,	  ‘Territorial	  Rights:	  Justificatory	  Strategies,”	  
(draft	  on	  file	  with	  author):	  3.	  
3	  Roughly,	  on	  a	  natural	  duty	  or	  functionalist	  account	  state’s	  enjoy	  legitimate	  political	  authority	  
insofar	  as	  they	  facilitate	  the	  performance	  of	  certain	  morally	  necessary	  tasks,	  ones	  that	  all	  moral	  
agents	  have	  natural	  or	  non-­‐voluntary	  duties	  to	  perform	  and	  that	  they	  can	  perform	  only	  via	  the	  
institutions	  of	  a	  legal-­‐political	  order.	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The	  need	  for	  such	  an	  extension	  or	  amendment	  follows	  from	  two	  criteria	  for	  a	  
plausible	  account	  of	  states’	  territorial	  rights,	  and	  the	  inability	  of	  a	  pure	  natural	  duty	  
or	  functionalist	  account	  of	  political	  authority	  to	  meet	  these	  criteria.	  	  The	  first	  
criterion,	  which	  I	  have	  already	  mentioned,	  requires	  that	  states,	  or	  at	  least	  legitimate	  
states,	  be	  shown	  to	  enjoy	  a	  right	  to	  rule	  over	  a	  particular	  territory,	  and	  not	  merely	  
some	  territory	  or	  other.	  	  The	  second	  criterion	  requires	  that	  a	  (legitimate)	  state’s	  
territorial	  rights	  survive	  violation,	  at	  least	  for	  some	  period	  of	  time.	  	  That	  is,	  we	  ought	  
to	  reject	  as	  implausible	  any	  account	  of	  states’	  territorial	  rights	  according	  to	  which	  
aggressors	  acquire	  an	  entitlement	  to	  rule	  a	  particular	  territory	  immediately	  upon	  
establishing	  de	  facto	  control	  over	  it.	  	  Instead,	  we	  need	  an	  account	  of	  states’	  
territorial	  rights	  that	  is	  responsive	  to	  history,	  one	  that	  explains	  and	  justifies	  the	  
persistence	  of	  territorial	  claims	  and,	  perhaps,	  their	  supersession,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  steps	  
that	  various	  parties	  ought	  to	  take	  to	  remedy	  violations	  of	  these	  rights.	  	  	  
A	  pure	  natural	  duty	  or	  functionalist	  account	  of	  political	  authority	  fails	  to	  
satisfy	  either	  criterion.	  	  The	  state’s	  justifiable	  claim	  to	  political	  authority,	  on	  
accounts	  of	  this	  type,	  follows	  from	  its	  moral	  necessity:	  the	  fact	  that	  justice	  can	  only	  
be	  achieved	  via	  the	  operation	  of	  a	  legitimate	  state’s	  institutions.	  	  Insofar	  as	  a	  
legitimate	  state	  implements	  a	  legal	  order	  via	  which	  it	  exercises	  control	  over	  a	  
particular	  territory,	  thereby	  enabling	  those	  who	  live	  there	  to	  realize	  justice	  (or	  just	  
relations	  with	  one	  another),	  it	  enjoys	  a	  right	  to	  territorial	  jurisdiction	  over	  that	  
territory.4	  	  Suppose,	  however,	  that	  one	  legitimate	  state	  forcibly	  annexes	  a	  portion	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Like	  many	  other	  contributors	  to	  this	  debate,	  I	  assume	  here	  that	  states	  can	  perform	  this	  morally	  
necessary	  function	  only	  be	  exercising	  more	  or	  less	  exclusive	  control	  over	  a	  given	  territory.	  	  See,	  e.g.,	  
David	  Miller,	  National	  Responsibility	  and	  Global	  Justice	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2007):	  214;	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the	  territory	  of	  another	  legitimate	  state.	  	  As	  long	  as	  the	  aggressor	  state	  continues	  to	  
meet	  the	  criteria	  for	  legitimacy	  –	  say	  respect	  for	  all	  of	  its	  (old	  and	  new)	  subjects’	  
basic	  rights	  –	  it	  immediately	  acquires	  a	  right	  to	  exercise	  jurisdiction	  over	  the	  
territory	  it	  controls.	  	  This	  is	  because	  on	  a	  pure	  natural	  duty	  or	  functionalist	  account,	  
de	  facto	  legitimate	  rule	  over	  a	  given	  territory	  is	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  for	  a	  de	  jure	  
right	  to	  rule	  that	  territory.	  	  Thus	  on	  a	  pure	  natural	  duty	  or	  functionalist	  account	  of	  
justified	  political	  authority,	  even	  legitimate	  states	  lack	  a	  right	  to	  any	  particular	  
territory.	  	  Instead,	  they	  only	  have	  a	  right	  to	  rule	  whatever	  territory	  they	  presently	  
happen	  to	  control,	  and	  they	  lose	  the	  right	  to	  rule	  that	  territory	  (and	  so	  any	  remedial	  
right	  to	  its	  return)	  immediately	  upon	  another	  legitimate	  state’s	  seizing	  control	  of	  it.	  	  	  
Those	  who	  think	  these	  implications	  absurd	  must	  either	  reject	  a	  natural	  duty	  or	  
functionalist	  approach	  to	  justifying	  political	  authority,	  or	  add	  to	  it	  a	  distinct	  moral	  
consideration	  (or	  considerations)	  that	  account	  for	  the	  particularity	  of	  states’	  
territorial	  rights	  and	  their	  persistence	  in	  cases	  of	  violation.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
A	  right	  to	  political	  self-­‐determination	  will	  not	  serve	  here,	  as	  the	  example	  
sketched	  in	  the	  previous	  paragraph	  demonstrates.	  	  The	  citizens	  of	  the	  state	  that	  has	  
had	  a	  portion	  of	  its	  territory	  forcibly	  annexed	  may	  well	  be	  able	  to	  continue	  
governing	  themselves	  via	  the	  institutions	  of	  an	  independent	  state	  in	  the	  territory	  
over	  which	  they	  retain	  control.	  	  Those	  residing	  in	  the	  annexed	  territory	  may	  be	  
permitted	  to	  relocate	  to	  that	  territory;	  indeed,	  the	  annexing	  state	  may	  force	  them	  to	  
do	  so.	  	  My	  point	  is	  not	  that	  these	  individuals	  suffer	  no	  wrong	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  
annexing	  state;	  indeed,	  I	  believe	  they	  do.	  	  Rather,	  I	  wish	  to	  highlight	  that	  it	  is	  their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Christopher	  Heath	  Wellman,	  A	  Theory	  of	  Secession:	  The	  Case	  for	  Political	  Self-­‐Determination	  
(Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2005):	  16.	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right	  to	  politically	  self-­‐determine	  in	  a	  particular	  place,	  and	  not	  their	  right	  to	  self-­‐rule	  
per	  se,	  that	  the	  annexing	  state	  violates.	  	  Evidently,	  then,	  an	  appeal	  must	  be	  made	  to	  
some	  moral	  consideration	  or	  value	  other	  than	  political	  self-­‐determination	  to	  
account	  for	  the	  particularity	  and	  persistence	  of	  a	  state’s	  territorial	  rights.	  
Stilz’s	  Account	  of	  Occupancy	  Rights	  
Anna	  Stilz	  has	  recently	  offered	  an	  account	  of	  states’	  jurisdictional	  rights	  that	  
grounds	  their	  claim	  to	  jurisdiction	  over	  a	  particular	  territory	  in	  its	  members’	  
individual	  rights	  of	  occupancy	  in	  that	  territory.	  	  Only	  if	  its	  citizens	  have	  a	  right	  to	  be	  
where	  they	  are,	  Stilz	  maintains,	  does	  the	  state	  that	  represents	  them	  have	  legitimate	  
jurisdiction	  over	  the	  territory	  they	  occupy	  (584).5	  	  Stilz	  characterizes	  the	  right	  of	  
occupancy	  as	  “a	  claim	  to	  be	  in	  legal	  residence	  on	  that	  territory:	  to	  be	  physically	  
present	  and	  to	  have	  one’s	  rights	  defined	  and	  enforced	  by	  whatever	  state	  has	  
jurisdiction	  there”	  (582).	  	  Autonomy,	  conceived	  of	  as	  an	  individual’s	  capacity	  to	  
form	  and	  act	  on	  a	  conception	  of	  the	  good,	  provides	  the	  moral	  basis	  for	  a	  right	  of	  
occupancy.	  	  In	  practically	  all	  cases,	  the	  conception	  of	  the	  good	  individuals	  form	  and	  
pursue	  rests	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  they	  will	  enjoy	  stable	  legal	  residence	  in	  the	  
place	  they	  reside	  (unless	  they	  voluntarily	  give	  it	  up).	  	  As	  Stilz	  writes,	  “we	  build	  our	  
lives	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  our	  goals,	  relationships,	  and	  pursuits	  will	  not	  be	  
unexpectedly	  destroyed	  through	  forced	  displacement”	  (583).	  	  Respect	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Citations	  in	  the	  text	  are	  to	  Stilz,	  ‘Nations.’	  	  Stilz	  defends	  three	  additional	  conditions	  that	  must	  also	  be	  
met	  for	  a	  state	  to	  have	  a	  morally	  justified	  claim	  to	  exercise	  jurisdiction	  over	  a	  particular	  territory,	  
namely	  that	  it	  effectively	  implement	  a	  system	  of	  law	  regulating	  property	  there,	  that	  its	  system	  of	  law	  
protect	  basic	  rights	  and	  provide	  for	  political	  participation,	  and	  that	  the	  state	  not	  be	  a	  usurper,	  i.e.	  that	  
it	  not	  deny	  a	  political	  people’s	  exercise	  of	  self-­‐determination.	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individuals	  as	  autonomous	  creatures,	  then,	  requires	  among	  other	  things	  respect	  for	  
their	  rights	  of	  occupancy.	  	  	  
Stilz	  notes,	  however,	  the	  possibility	  that	  a	  person	  may	  be	  morally	  at	  fault	  for	  
coming	  to	  reside	  in	  a	  given	  territory,	  and	  forming	  and	  pursuing	  life	  plans	  premised	  
on	  continued	  legal	  residence	  in	  it.	  	  For	  example,	  she	  may	  do	  so	  by	  forcibly	  displacing	  
those	  who	  rightfully	  occupy	  the	  territory.	  	  Stilz	  maintains	  that	  such	  a	  person	  cannot	  
acquire	  a	  right	  of	  occupancy	  to	  the	  territory	  in	  question,	  even	  if	  she	  resides	  there	  
and	  her	  ability	  to	  advance	  her	  goals,	  relationships,	  and	  pursuits	  depends	  upon	  legal	  
residence	  in	  that	  territory.	  	  In	  sum,	  a	  person	  enjoys	  a	  right	  of	  occupancy	  if	  “(1)	  he	  
resides	  there	  now	  or	  has	  previously	  done	  so;	  (2)	  legal	  residence	  within	  that	  
territory	  is	  fundamental	  to	  the	  integrity	  of	  his	  structure	  of	  personal	  relationships,	  
goals,	  and	  pursuits;	  and	  (3)	  his	  connection	  to	  that	  particular	  territory	  was	  formed	  
through	  no	  fault	  of	  his	  own”	  (585).	  	  Following	  Stilz,	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  this	  account	  of	  the	  
conditions	  under	  which	  a	  person	  enjoys	  a	  right	  of	  occupancy	  as	  the	  occupation	  
principle.	  
On	  Stilz’s	  account,	  state	  A	  enjoys	  a	  right	  to	  territorial	  jurisdiction	  over	  
territory	  T	  at	  time	  t1	  only	  if	  those	  individuals	  who	  reside	  in	  T	  have	  rights	  of	  
occupancy	  in	  T.	  	  Suppose	  that	  at	  time	  t2	  state	  B	  seizes	  territory	  T	  (i.e.	  unilaterally	  
imposes	  its	  rule	  on	  that	  territory),	  forcibly	  expels	  all	  of	  the	  individuals	  residing	  
there,	  and	  repopulates	  T	  with	  some	  of	  its	  own	  citizens.	  	  Though	  state	  B	  may	  exercise	  
de	  facto	  jurisdiction	  over	  territory	  T,	  it	  will	  not	  enjoy	  a	  right	  to	  do	  so.	  	  Rather,	  at	  
time	  t2	  and	  for	  some	  time	  thereafter,	  state	  B	  will	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  right	  the	  wrong	  (or	  
wrongs)	  it	  has	  committed.	  	  In	  Stilz’s	  words,	  the	  aggressors	  must	  “restore	  the	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territory	  to	  those	  they	  expelled”	  (585).6	  	  Ideally	  state	  B	  will	  discharge	  this	  remedial	  
duty	  (under	  duress,	  perhaps,	  from	  state	  A	  and	  other	  states	  as	  well).	  	  But	  suppose	  it	  
does	  not.	  	  What	  then?	  	  	  
Suppose	  that	  state	  B’s	  wrongful	  seizure	  of	  T	  and	  forcible	  expulsion	  of	  its	  then	  
population	  goes	  uncorrected	  long	  enough	  for	  all	  of	  the	  current	  residents	  of	  T	  to	  have	  
been	  born	  there,	  while	  all	  of	  the	  people	  displaced	  from	  T	  have	  died.	  	  At	  this	  point,	  
Stilz	  maintains,	  all	  of	  the	  residents	  of	  T	  (who	  we	  will	  assume	  are	  all	  full	  and	  equal	  
citizens	  of	  state	  B)	  enjoy	  rights	  of	  occupancy	  in	  T.	  	  Each	  of	  them	  resides	  in	  T,	  the	  
integrity	  of	  their	  structures	  of	  personal	  relationships,	  goals,	  and	  pursuits	  almost	  
certainly	  depends	  on	  stable	  legal	  residence	  in	  T,	  and	  none	  of	  them	  has	  formed	  a	  
connection	  to	  T	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  morally	  faulty	  act.	  	  Assuming	  that	  state	  B	  meets	  the	  
other	  criteria	  for	  a	  right	  to	  territorial	  jurisdiction	  Stilz	  sets	  out,	  state	  B	  enjoys	  a	  right	  
of	  jurisdiction	  over	  T.	  
What	  of	  the	  descendants	  of	  those	  forcibly	  expelled	  from	  T	  by	  state	  B?	  	  Do	  they	  
have	  any	  claim	  to	  stable	  legal	  residence	  in	  T?	  	  Stilz	  responds	  that	  it	  depends	  on	  
whether	  the	  descendants	  have	  established	  stable	  legal	  residence	  elsewhere	  –	  or,	  
more	  precisely,	  if	  they	  enjoy	  full	  and	  equal	  status	  as	  citizens	  in	  some	  other	  
legitimate	  state	  (586).	  	  If	  they	  do,	  then	  their	  autonomy	  is	  sufficiently	  secured	  where	  
they	  now	  reside,	  and	  so	  they	  have	  no	  moral	  justification	  for	  demanding	  stable	  legal	  
residence	  in	  T.	  	  That	  is,	  they	  have	  no	  claim	  against	  those	  who	  now	  reside	  in	  T	  or	  
against	  the	  state	  that	  exercises	  jurisdiction	  over	  it	  that	  they	  be	  permitted	  to	  take	  up	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  At	  a	  minimum,	  remediation	  will	  require	  that	  the	  original	  inhabitants	  be	  readmitted	  to	  T.	  It	  may	  also	  
require	  the	  resettlement	  of	  those	  who	  settled	  or	  were	  born	  in	  T	  after	  state	  B	  unjustly	  seized	  control	  
of	  it,	  and	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  state	  B’s	  governance	  over	  that	  territory.	  	  I	  discuss	  these	  points	  in	  greater	  
detail	  below.	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permanent	  residence	  as	  full	  and	  equal	  citizens	  in	  T.7	  	  However,	  if	  the	  descendants	  of	  
those	  forcibly	  expelled	  from	  T	  by	  state	  B	  do	  not	  enjoy	  full	  and	  equal	  citizenship	  in	  
another	  (legitimate)	  state,	  then	  Stilz	  maintains	  that	  they	  have	  a	  right	  of	  return	  to	  T	  
(586).	  	  That	  right	  is	  grounded	  in	  the	  treatment	  owed	  to	  them	  in	  virtue	  of	  their	  
autonomy.	  	  	  
I	  find	  the	  occupation	  principle	  attractive	  for	  three	  reasons.	  	  First,	  like	  Stilz,	  I	  
both	  defend	  a	  natural	  duty	  account	  of	  legitimate	  political	  authority	  but	  find	  myself	  
very	  uncomfortable	  with	  the	  implication	  that	  a	  state’s	  right	  to	  rule	  a	  given	  territory	  
follows	  straightaway	  from	  the	  fact	  of	  its	  rule	  over	  that	  territory.	  	  The	  occupation	  
principle,	  it	  seems	  to	  me,	  offers	  a	  solution	  to	  this	  problem	  that	  does	  not	  require	  
endorsing	  either	  a	  Lockean	  or	  Nationalist	  account	  of	  how	  it	  is	  that	  states	  acquire	  a	  
right	  to	  rule	  a	  particular	  territory.	  	  Endorsement	  of	  either	  of	  these	  accounts	  of	  
territorial	  right	  might	  well	  imply	  that	  one	  ought	  also	  to	  endorse	  their	  respective	  
accounts	  of	  political	  authority,	  and	  since	  I	  find	  both	  those	  accounts	  wanting	  I	  have	  
good	  reason	  to	  seek	  an	  alternative	  justification	  for	  the	  particularity	  and	  persistence	  
of	  states’	  territorial	  rights.	  	  Second,	  the	  occupation	  principle	  coheres	  with	  a	  general	  
but	  vague	  intuition	  I	  have	  regarding	  the	  persistence	  of	  territorial	  claims	  in	  the	  face	  
of	  their	  violation,	  namely	  that	  they	  are	  eventually	  superseded	  but	  that	  this	  requires	  
some	  passage	  of	  time.8	  	  The	  occupation	  principle	  holds	  out	  the	  hope	  of	  providing	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Stilz	  notes	  that	  the	  supersession	  of	  an	  agent’s	  occupancy	  right	  in	  T	  need	  not	  entail	  the	  loss	  of	  any	  
claim	  on	  that	  agent’s	  part	  to	  compensation	  for	  harm	  or	  reparation	  for	  confiscated	  property.	  	  Though	  I	  
accept	  the	  logical	  claim	  here,	  it	  is	  not	  obvious	  to	  me	  why	  Stilz’s	  argument	  for	  the	  supersession	  of	  
occupancy	  rights	  does	  not	  apply	  equally	  to	  the	  supersession	  of	  property	  rights.	  
8	  A	  defense	  of	  that	  intuition	  does	  not	  require	  endorsement	  of	  the	  occupation	  principle;	  Miller,	  for	  
example,	  also	  defends	  the	  eventual	  supersession	  of	  territorial	  rights	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  his	  Nationalist	  
account	  of	  territorial	  rights.	  	  See	  Miller,	  National	  Responsibility,	  219-­‐20.	  	  Simmons,	  in	  contrast,	  rejects	  
the	  supersession	  of	  rights	  –	  explicitly	  in	  the	  case	  of	  “mere	  passage	  of	  time,”	  but	  also	  implicitly	  via	  his	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principled	  account	  of	  when,	  and	  why,	  claims	  to	  territory	  lapse;	  that	  is,	  it	  offers	  a	  
structure	  and	  rationale	  for	  my	  general	  and	  vague	  intuition.	  	  Finally,	  I	  approve	  of	  the	  
priority	  Stilz	  assigns	  to	  individuals	  over	  the	  collective.	  	  The	  state’s	  right	  to	  rule	  a	  
particular	  territory	  follows	  from	  its	  individual	  subjects’	  rights	  to	  occupy	  that	  
territory,	  rather	  than	  the	  state’s	  (or,	  what	  is	  not	  the	  same,	  the	  nation’s)	  members	  
having	  a	  right	  to	  (stable	  legal)	  residence	  in	  a	  particular	  territory	  because	  the	  state	  
(or	  nation)	  has	  a	  right	  to	  rule	  it.9	  	  	  	  	  	  
Nevertheless,	  I	  believe	  Stilz’s	  account	  of	  the	  alleged	  right	  of	  occupancy	  stands	  
in	  need	  of	  several	  clarifications	  and	  corrections	  before	  it	  can	  be	  fairly	  and	  properly	  
assessed.	  	  That	  is	  the	  primary	  task	  I	  undertake	  here,	  though	  I	  conclude	  with	  a	  
preliminary	  remark	  on	  the	  corrected	  account’s	  plausibility.	  	  I	  begin	  in	  the	  next	  
section	  by	  exploring	  what	  it	  is	  to	  occupy	  a	  territory	  in	  the	  sense	  relevant	  to	  the	  
occupation	  principle,	  before	  turning	  in	  the	  following	  sections	  to	  revisions	  to	  the	  
occupation	  principle’s	  implications	  for	  both	  the	  acquisition	  of	  a	  right	  to	  occupy	  a	  
given	  territory	  and	  a	  right	  of	  return	  to	  it.	  
On	  the	  Nature	  of	  Occupancy	  
Consider,	  first,	  the	  nature	  of	  occupancy.	  	  What	  is	  it	  to	  occupy	  a	  territory?	  	  
Until	  we	  have	  an	  answer	  to	  this	  question,	  we	  cannot	  determine	  what	  sort	  of	  actions	  
violate	  a	  person’s	  right	  to	  occupy	  a	  territory.10	  	  Moreover,	  insofar	  as	  the	  scope	  of	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
critique	  of	  Jeremy	  Waldron’s	  account	  of	  rights	  supersession	  and	  legal	  doctrines	  such	  as	  adverse	  
possession.	  	  See	  ‘Historical	  Rights	  and	  Fair	  Shares’	  in	  A.	  John	  Simmons,	  Justification	  and	  Legitimacy.	  	  	  
9	  Compare	  to	  Miller,	  ‘Territorial	  Rights,’	  258.	  	  	  
10	  Similarly,	  and	  by	  way	  of	  illustration,	  unless	  we	  know	  what	  counts	  as	  speech,	  we	  cannot	  determine	  
what	  counts	  as	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  right	  to	  freedom	  of	  speech.	  	  This	  comparison	  suggests	  an	  intriguing	  
possibility,	  namely	  that	  our	  conception	  of	  the	  act	  –	  e.g.	  speech	  or	  occupancy	  –	  develops	  or	  evolves	  in	  
tandem	  with	  the	  development	  or	  evolution	  of	  our	  conception	  of	  the	  right	  to	  perform	  the	  act	  in	  
question.	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state’s	  territorial	  rights	  –	  that	  is,	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  territory	  over	  which	  the	  state	  
has	  a	  right	  to	  exercise	  jurisdiction	  –	  depends	  on	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  occupancy	  rights	  of	  
its	  subjects,	  we	  cannot	  determine	  the	  former	  until	  we	  determine	  the	  latter.	  	  The	  path	  
to	  a	  proper	  understanding	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  an	  individual’s	  occupancy	  right	  
presumably	  begins	  with	  an	  account	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  occupancy.	  
On	  Stilz’s	  account	  occupancy	  clearly	  involves	  extended	  residence	  in	  a	  
particular	  place	  together	  with	  a	  person’s	  formation	  and	  pursuit	  of	  a	  conception	  of	  
the	  good	  premised	  on	  continued	  residence	  in	  that	  place	  –	  or,	  a	  bit	  more	  precisely,	  
premised	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  one	  will	  not	  be	  involuntarily	  displaced	  from	  that	  
territory	  (583).	  	  	  Normally	  an	  agent’s	  conception	  of	  the	  good	  will	  include	  
participation	  in	  various	  personal	  relationships,	  setting	  and	  striving	  to	  achieve	  
various	  goals,	  and	  adopting	  various	  pursuits.	  	  Many	  of	  these	  relationships,	  goals,	  and	  
pursuits	  will	  have	  a	  particularized	  territorial	  dimension.	  	  For	  example,	  many	  of	  my	  
relationships	  will	  be	  with	  people	  I	  regularly	  engage	  in	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  interaction,	  such	  
as	  my	  neighbors	  and	  my	  co-­‐workers.	  	  Similarly	  many	  of	  my	  goals	  and	  pursuits	  will	  
involve	  a	  connection	  to	  a	  particular	  place,	  as	  in	  my	  goal	  of	  renovating	  and	  
redecorating	  my	  home.	  	  Notice,	  though,	  that	  the	  formation	  and	  pursuit	  of	  plans	  like	  
these	  require	  more	  than	  extended	  residence	  in	  a	  particular	  place;	  they	  also	  require	  a	  
relatively	  stable	  set	  of	  social	  norms	  that	  structure	  the	  interactions	  between	  the	  
people	  who	  reside	  there.11	  	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  relatively	  stable	  social	  norms	  that	  both	  
promote	  and	  reflect	  a	  degree	  of	  shared	  understanding	  regarding	  the	  normative	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Unless	  this	  community	  lives	  in	  splendid	  isolation	  from	  others,	  it	  also	  requires	  a	  relatively	  stable	  set	  
of	  social	  norms	  that	  structure	  interactions	  between	  long	  term	  residents	  of	  the	  territory,	  visitors	  to	  it,	  
and	  long	  term	  residents	  of	  other	  territories.	  	  I	  leave	  these	  complications	  aside	  here.	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structure	  of	  relationships	  such	  as	  friendship,	  family,	  and	  co-­‐membership	  in	  various	  
political	  and	  social	  groups,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  normative	  structure	  of	  possession	  and	  
exchange,	  agents	  are	  likely	  to	  find	  it	  impossible	  to	  form	  and	  act	  on	  all	  but	  the	  most	  
minimal	  of	  plans.	  	  Of	  course,	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  stability	  of	  such	  norms,	  and/or	  in	  the	  
extent	  to	  which	  people	  share	  a	  common	  understanding	  of	  their	  content	  and	  relation	  
to	  one	  another,	  or	  how	  disagreements	  on	  such	  matters	  should	  be	  resolved,	  can	  
enhance	  people’s	  ability	  to	  form	  and	  pursue	  conceptions	  of	  the	  good.	  	  The	  point	  on	  
which	  I	  wish	  focus	  here,	  however,	  is	  the	  practical	  necessity	  of	  some	  minimal	  social	  
order	  if	  agents	  are	  to	  exercise	  their	  autonomy	  at	  all.	  
In	  the	  sense	  relevant	  to	  understanding	  occupancy	  rights,	  then,	  a	  person	  
occupies	  a	  particular	  territory	  if	  he	  forms	  and	  pursues	  a	  conception	  of	  the	  good	  life	  
that	  presumes	  continued	  residence	  in	  that	  territory,	  and	  that	  is	  informed	  by	  the	  
social	  norms	  that	  structure	  the	  interaction	  of	  those	  who	  reside	  in	  it.	  	  But	  what	  sort	  
of	  social	  norms?	  	  Non-­‐legal	  conventions?	  	  Legal	  norms?	  	  The	  legal	  norms	  of	  a	  
legitimate	  state?	  	  Stilz’s	  answer,	  I	  think,	  is	  legal	  norms.12	  	  She	  defines	  a	  right	  of	  
occupancy	  as	  “a	  claim	  to	  be	  in	  legal	  residence	  on	  that	  territory:	  to	  be	  physically	  
present	  and	  to	  have	  one’s	  rights	  defined	  and	  enforced	  by	  whatever	  state	  has	  
jurisdiction	  there”	  (582	  –	  Stilz’s	  italics).	  	  Furthermore,	  she	  includes	  among	  the	  
necessary	  conditions	  for	  a	  person’s	  right	  to	  occupy	  the	  fact	  that	  “legal	  residence	  
within	  that	  territory	  is	  fundamental	  to	  the	  integrity	  of	  his	  structure	  of	  personal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Note	  that	  the	  question	  here	  concerns	  the	  existence	  conditions	  for	  individuals’	  occupancy	  rights	  in	  a	  
particular	  territory,	  not	  the	  moral	  justifiability	  of	  the	  state’s	  right	  to	  territorial	  jurisdiction	  over	  it.	  	  
On	  Stilz	  account,	  only	  legitimate	  states	  enjoy	  the	  latter.	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relationships,	  goals,	  and	  pursuits”	  (585	  –	  italics	  mine).13	  	  Thus	  I	  think	  it	  safe	  to	  
conclude	  that,	  on	  Stilz’s	  view,	  if	  a	  person	  has	  come	  to	  be	  present	  in	  a	  territory	  
through	  no	  fault	  of	  his	  own,	  and	  having	  resided	  there	  for	  an	  extended	  period	  of	  time	  
has	  formed	  and	  pursued	  a	  conception	  of	  the	  good	  life	  structured	  by	  the	  laws	  of	  the	  
state	  that	  governs	  that	  territory	  and	  premised	  on	  continued	  residence	  in	  it,	  then	  he	  
enjoys	  a	  right	  to	  occupy	  that	  territory.	  	  Henceforth	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  this	  understanding	  
of	  occupancy	  and	  the	  right	  thereto	  as	  the	  legal	  account.	  
The	  legal	  account	  of	  occupancy	  may	  seem	  to	  provide	  a	  circular	  argument	  for	  
a	  state’s	  right	  to	  exercise	  territorial	  jurisdiction	  over	  a	  particular	  territory.14	  	  States	  
get	  a	  right	  to	  do	  something,	  namely	  exercise	  jurisdiction	  over	  a	  particular	  territory,	  
because	  their	  subjects	  do	  something,	  namely	  occupy	  that	  territory.	  	  But	  their	  
subjects	  occupy	  that	  territory	  only	  because	  they	  enjoy	  legal	  rights	  there;	  that	  is,	  only	  
because	  the	  state	  exercises	  jurisdiction	  over	  it.	  	  If	  a	  state’s	  exercise	  of	  jurisdiction	  
over	  T	  is	  necessary	  for	  a	  person	  to	  enjoy	  a	  right	  of	  occupancy	  in	  it,	  then	  how	  can	  that	  
person’s	  occupancy	  right	  serve	  to	  justify	  the	  state’s	  exercise	  of	  jurisdiction	  over	  T?	  	  
The	  impression	  of	  circularity	  arises,	  however,	  only	  if	  we	  conceive	  of	  occupancy	  in	  
Lockean	  terms:	  as	  a	  pre-­‐political	  activity	  (i.e.	  one	  whose	  performance	  need	  not	  be	  
characterized	  as	  taking	  place	  within	  the	  context	  of	  an	  existing	  political,	  or	  even	  
social,	  order),	  and	  something	  that	  individuals	  do	  to	  take	  possession	  of	  a	  particular	  
piece	  of	  territory.	  	  But	  the	  acquisition	  of	  a	  right	  of	  occupancy	  does	  not	  involve	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  In	  the	  accompanying	  footnote	  she	  makes	  clear	  that	  it	  is	  a	  person’s	  existing	  or	  actual	  structure	  of	  
goals,	  pursuits,	  and	  personal	  relationships	  that	  matter,	  not	  those	  to	  which	  a	  person	  may	  aspire.	  	  That	  
a	  person	  aspires	  to	  pursue	  various	  goals,	  develop	  various	  relationships,	  etc.,	  in	  a	  particular	  place	  
does	  not	  give	  him	  a	  claim	  to	  legal	  residence	  in	  that	  place.	  
14	  Kolers,	  for	  example,	  suggests	  that	  it	  does.	  	  See	  ‘Attachment	  to	  Territory:	  Status	  or	  Achievement?’	  
Canadian	  Journal	  of	  Philosophy	  42:2	  (2012):	  108-­‐9.	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essentially	  doing	  something	  to	  a	  particular	  territory;	  it	  is	  not,	  for	  instance,	  a	  matter	  
of	  increasing	  its	  value,	  however	  that	  might	  be	  understood.15	  	  Rather,	  the	  acquisition	  
of	  a	  right	  of	  occupancy	  in	  a	  given	  territory	  is	  the	  result	  of	  something	  that	  individuals	  
do	  in	  a	  territory,	  namely	  forming	  and	  pursuing	  life	  plans	  structured	  by	  the	  legal	  
regime	  that	  governs	  the	  territory	  and	  premised	  on	  continued	  residence	  there.	  	  Of	  
course,	  in	  forming	  and	  pursuing	  their	  life	  plans	  people	  will	  surely	  do	  things	  to	  the	  
territory	  that	  transform	  it	  in	  myriad	  ways.	  	  The	  legal	  regime	  to	  which	  those	  who	  
reside	  in	  the	  territory	  are	  subject	  may	  well	  treat	  many	  of	  those	  transformations	  as	  
giving	  rise	  to,	  or	  as	  violations	  of,	  property	  rights.	  	  But	  forcible	  displacement	  from	  the	  
particular	  territory	  individuals	  have	  a	  right	  to	  occupy	  wrongs	  them	  not	  simply	  by	  
violating	  their	  property	  rights	  but	  by	  uprooting	  the	  entire	  latticework	  of	  concrete	  
legal	  rights	  that	  gives	  structure	  to	  their	  lives	  and	  informs	  their	  plans.	  	  In	  the	  sense	  of	  
‘life’	  invoked	  when	  we	  speak	  of	  the	  life	  a	  person	  lives,	  forcible	  displacement	  literally	  
rips	  a	  person’s	  life	  away.	  	  Individuals’	  occupancy	  rights,	  then,	  enjoy	  a	  justificatory	  
priority	  over	  a	  state’s	  right	  to	  territorial	  jurisdiction;	  the	  basis	  for	  a	  state’s	  claim	  to	  
rule	  a	  particular	  territory	  is	  the	  fundamental	  contribution	  doing	  so	  makes	  to	  its	  
subjects’	  autonomy.	  	  	  
A	  second	  worry	  regarding	  the	  legal	  account	  of	  occupancy	  concerns	  its	  
implications	  for	  those	  who	  do	  not	  live	  under	  a	  legal	  regime.	  	  Consider	  those	  Somalis	  
living	  in	  the	  region	  once	  governed	  by	  the	  state	  of	  Somalia.	  	  Stilz	  describes	  the	  region	  
(at	  least	  for	  argumentative	  purposes)	  as	  a	  “severe	  failed	  state,”	  one	  in	  which	  there	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Locke,	  Two	  Treatises	  of	  Government,	  Chs.	  5	  and	  8;	  A.	  John	  Simmons,	  ‘On	  the	  Territorial	  Rights	  of	  
States,’	  Philosophical	  Issues	  11:1	  (2001);	  Miller,	  National	  Responsibility,	  218-­‐19,	  and	  ‘Territorial	  
Rights,’	  259-­‐262.	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exists	  no	  collective	  agent	  capable	  of	  organizing	  and	  sustaining	  legitimate	  political	  
authority.	  	  Indeed,	  the	  region	  is	  one	  in	  which	  there	  exists	  no	  centralized	  political	  
authority	  at	  all,	  let	  alone	  a	  legitimate	  one.	  	  Suppose	  we	  were	  to	  treat	  the	  existence	  of	  
a	  centralized	  political	  authority	  as	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  legal	  
order,	  properly	  understood.	  	  The	  failure	  of	  the	  Somali	  state	  would	  entail	  the	  absence	  
of	  a	  legal	  order	  in	  the	  region,	  which	  (perhaps	  after	  some	  time	  has	  passed)	  would	  
entail	  in	  turn	  that	  those	  living	  in	  the	  region	  –	  call	  them	  Somalis	  -­‐	  enjoyed	  no	  
occupancy	  rights	  there.16	  	  This	  is	  so	  because	  one	  of	  the	  conditions	  for	  the	  enjoyment	  
of	  an	  occupancy	  right	  in	  a	  particular	  place	  is	  that	  legal	  residence	  within	  that	  territory	  
is	  fundamental	  to	  the	  integrity	  of	  a	  person’s	  structure	  of	  personal	  relationships,	  
goals,	  and	  pursuits.	  	  Yet	  if	  Somalis	  do	  not	  enjoy	  occupancy	  rights	  in	  the	  region	  once	  
governed	  by	  the	  Somali	  state,	  then	  their	  forcible	  relocation	  from	  that	  territory	  to	  
another	  would	  not	  necessarily	  constitute	  a	  wrong	  done	  to	  them.	  	  Insofar	  as	  forcible	  
relocation	  did	  wrong	  them,	  it	  would	  not	  be	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  of	  forcible	  relocation	  itself	  
but,	  say,	  some	  feature	  of	  how	  it	  was	  carried	  out	  such	  as	  physical	  harm	  done	  to	  the	  
Somalis	  as	  part	  of	  their	  expulsion	  from	  the	  territory.	  	  This	  will	  likely	  strike	  many	  
readers	  as	  absurd,	  and	  in	  fact	  Stilz	  rejects	  it.	  	  In	  a	  footnote	  she	  asserts,	  but	  does	  not	  
argue	  for,	  the	  claim	  that	  while	  tribal	  or	  clan	  groups	  in	  the	  region	  formerly	  governed	  
by	  Somalia	  may	  lack	  territorial	  rights,	  they	  do	  have	  “rights	  of	  occupancy	  in	  their	  
territory,	  which	  means	  that	  even	  if	  they	  are	  incorporated	  into	  another	  state	  justly…	  
they	  may	  not	  be	  resettled	  or	  deprived	  of	  their	  land”	  (599).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  For	  simplicity’s	  sake	  I	  will	  use	  the	  term	  ‘Somalis’	  to	  refer	  to	  those	  living	  the	  area	  formerly	  governed	  
by	  the	  Somali	  state,	  though	  in	  fact	  not	  all	  of	  those	  who	  live	  in	  the	  region	  are	  members	  of	  the	  Somali	  
ethnic	  group	  (and	  not	  all	  ethnic	  Somalis	  live	  in	  the	  region	  in	  question).	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One	  way	  for	  Stilz	  to	  maintain	  this	  conclusion,	  consistent	  with	  the	  account	  of	  a	  
right	  to	  occupancy	  she	  sets	  out,	  would	  be	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  Somali	  state	  
has	  not	  created	  a	  region	  in	  which	  no	  law	  exists,	  and	  so	  one	  whose	  residents	  cannot	  
form	  and	  pursue	  conceptions	  of	  the	  good	  informed	  by	  a	  legal	  order.	  	  Rather,	  the	  
domestic	  legal	  order	  of	  a	  modern	  state	  has	  been	  replaced	  by	  one	  or	  more	  tribal	  or	  
religious	  legal	  orders.	  	  Alternatively,	  whether	  the	  social	  order	  realized	  in	  (parts	  of)	  
the	  territory	  in	  question	  constitutes	  a	  legal	  order,	  properly	  understood,	  may	  be	  
irrelevant	  for	  an	  account	  of	  occupancy	  rights.	  What	  matters,	  as	  I	  argued	  above,	  is	  
that	  a	  person	  form	  and	  pursue	  a	  conception	  of	  the	  good	  against	  a	  background	  of	  
social	  norms	  that	  structure	  his	  or	  her	  interaction	  with	  a	  fair	  number	  of	  those	  who	  
reside	  in	  the	  same	  territory.	  	  Even	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  state	  people’s	  lives	  may	  be	  
sufficiently	  well-­‐ordered	  according	  to	  relatively	  widespread	  and	  stable	  social	  norms	  
that	  they	  are	  able	  to	  form	  and	  pursue	  complex	  and	  ambitious	  (if	  sometimes	  
precarious)	  life-­‐plans,	  in	  which	  case	  their	  forcible	  displacement	  from	  the	  territory	  in	  
which	  they	  reside	  will	  constitute	  disrespect	  for	  them	  as	  autonomous	  creatures.	  This	  
appears	  to	  be	  the	  case	  for	  many	  Somalis,	  even	  if	  some	  of	  them	  regularly	  interact	  
with	  others	  who	  do	  not	  acknowledge	  the	  same	  social	  norms.	  	  The	  region	  formerly	  
ruled	  by	  the	  state	  of	  Somalia	  may	  now	  be	  stateless,	  and	  perhaps	  even	  lawless,	  but	  
few	  of	  its	  people	  live	  outside	  the	  ambit	  of	  social	  norms.	  	  My	  suggestion,	  then,	  is	  that	  
we	  hold	  that	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  a	  right	  of	  occupancy	  in	  a	  particular	  territory	  
is	  that	  social	  norm	  governed	  residence	  within	  it,	  rather	  than	  the	  narrower	  legal	  
residence,	  is	  fundamental	  to	  the	  integrity	  of	  a	  person’s	  life	  plans.17	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Either	  of	  the	  two	  proposals	  in	  this	  paragraph	  for	  reconciling	  Somali’s	  occupancy	  rights	  with	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Occupancy	  Rights	  and	  the	  Right	  of	  Return	  
Stilz’s	  account	  of	  the	  remedial	  duties	  generated	  by	  the	  violation	  of	  occupancy	  
rights	  stands	  in	  need	  of	  correction.	  	  Consider,	  first,	  the	  plight	  of	  the	  descendants	  of	  
those	  unjustly	  displaced	  from	  territory	  T.18	  Stilz	  maintains	  that	  if	  they	  have	  achieved	  
full	  and	  equal	  citizenship	  in	  the	  state	  in	  which	  they	  reside,	  the	  descendants	  of	  the	  
displaced	  have	  no	  occupancy	  right	  in	  T,	  and	  so	  no	  right	  of	  return	  to	  it.	  	  However,	  she	  
asserts	  that	  if	  “they	  remain	  a	  stateless	  people,	  reside	  in	  an	  illegitimate	  state,	  or	  form	  
a	  population	  of	  second-­‐class	  citizens	  ruled	  by	  another	  people…	  then	  they	  have	  an	  
outstanding	  occupancy	  claim…[that	  gives	  them]	  a	  right	  to	  be	  readmitted	  to	  the	  
territory	  and	  granted	  equal	  citizenship	  there”	  (586).	  	  Stilz’s	  account	  of	  occupancy	  
does	  not	  warrant	  this	  conclusion,	  a	  fact	  of	  which	  she	  seems	  dimly	  aware,	  as	  she	  
remarks	  in	  a	  telling	  footnote	  attached	  to	  the	  above	  quotation	  that	  “given	  the	  
structure	  of	  their	  relationships	  and	  pursuits,	  it	  may	  be	  that	  the	  victims’	  descendants’	  
autonomy	  would	  be	  best	  guaranteed	  by	  granting	  them	  equal	  citizenship	  in	  the	  state	  
to	  which	  they	  have	  been	  displaced”	  (586).	  	  Stilz’s	  account	  of	  occupancy	  rights	  
actually	  commits	  her	  to	  a	  stronger	  claim.	  	  Not	  only	  might	  the	  victims’	  descendant’s	  
autonomy	  be	  best	  guaranteed	  by	  granting	  them	  citizenship	  in	  the	  state	  in	  which	  they	  
reside	  (and,	  let	  us	  assume,	  have	  always	  resided),	  but	  given	  that	  they	  have	  formed	  
and	  pursued	  a	  conception	  of	  the	  good	  in	  this	  state’s	  territory,	  one	  informed	  by	  the	  
operation	  of	  this	  state’s	  legal	  regime,	  they	  have	  a	  right	  to	  occupancy	  in	  this	  state’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
absence	  of	  any	  state	  ruling	  the	  territory	  in	  question	  suffices	  to	  refute	  Kolers’s	  claim	  that,	  on	  Stilz’s	  
account,	  occupancy	  must	  consist	  in	  mere	  presence	  in	  a	  place,	  rather	  than	  the	  enjoyment	  of	  legal	  
rights	  (or	  other	  social-­‐norm	  based	  claims)	  in	  that	  place.	  	  See	  Kolers,	  ‘Attachment,’	  107-­‐9.	  
18	  Like	  most	  contributors	  to	  this	  debate,	  I	  ignore	  the	  non-­‐identity	  argument	  for	  the	  conclusion	  that	  
(many	  of)	  the	  descendants	  of	  those	  unjustly	  displaced	  from	  a	  given	  territory	  suffer	  no	  wrong.	  	  I	  
believe,	  however,	  that	  such	  an	  argument	  deserves	  more	  attention	  from	  those	  writing	  on	  territorial	  
rights	  than	  it	  has	  received	  thus	  far.	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territory.	  	  That	  right	  is	  grounded	  in	  respect	  for	  their	  autonomy.	  	  Granted,	  this	  claim	  
rests	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  neither	  a	  state’s	  illegitimacy	  nor	  second-­‐class	  
citizenship	  necessarily	  precludes	  individuals’	  formation	  and	  pursuit	  of	  a	  conception	  
of	  the	  good	  premised	  on	  stable	  legal	  residence	  in	  a	  particular	  territory.	  	  But	  that	  
assumption	  seems	  both	  true	  and	  a	  claim	  Stilz	  might	  well	  wish	  to	  accept,	  since	  its	  
denial	  would	  entail	  that	  the	  forcible	  displacement	  of	  billions	  of	  people	  currently	  
living	  in	  illegitimate	  states	  would	  not	  wrong	  them	  per	  se.	  	  Of	  course,	  the	  
descendants	  of	  the	  displaced	  (and	  all	  other	  people)	  do	  have	  a	  claim	  to	  full	  and	  equal	  
citizenship	  in	  a	  legitimate	  state.	  	  That	  claim,	  however,	  is	  grounded	  (at	  least	  on	  Stilz’s	  
Kantian	  account)	  in	  their	  right	  to	  external	  freedom	  (i.e.	  freedom-­‐as-­‐independence	  
from	  the	  will	  of	  others,	  or	  non-­‐domination).	  	  Their	  claim	  to	  full	  and	  equal	  citizenship	  
in	  the	  state	  that	  governs	  this	  particular	  territory,	  however,	  is	  grounded	  in	  their	  right	  
to	  occupy	  the	  territory	  in	  question.	  
	   What	  about	  the	  descendants	  of	  the	  displaced	  who	  remain	  stateless?	  	  
Residents	  of	  refugee	  camps,	  for	  instance,	  often	  enjoy	  few	  legal	  rights	  within	  the	  
territory	  (of	  the	  state)	  in	  which	  they	  reside.	  	  The	  absence	  of	  legal	  entitlements	  to	  
work,	  to	  purchase	  a	  home,	  or	  to	  travel	  freely	  throughout	  the	  state’s	  territory	  (or	  
across	  its	  borders)	  likely	  severely	  restrict	  an	  individuals’	  ability	  to	  form	  and	  pursue	  
a	  conception	  of	  the	  good.	  	  Suppose	  that	  this	  is	  in	  fact	  true	  of	  the	  descendants	  of	  
those	  displaced	  from	  territory	  T	  by	  state	  B;	  unemployed,	  living	  in	  shelters	  they	  do	  
not	  own,	  confined	  to	  refugee	  camps,	  and	  with	  no	  control	  over	  their	  future,	  these	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individuals	  form	  and	  pursue	  only	  the	  most	  stunted	  life	  plans.19	  	  Contrary	  to	  Stilz’s	  
claim,	  even	  these	  individuals	  do	  not	  enjoy	  a	  right	  of	  return	  to	  the	  territory	  from	  
which	  their	  forebears	  were	  unjustly	  displaced,	  and	  full	  citizenship	  in	  the	  state	  that	  
governs	  that	  territory.	  	  Rather,	  they	  have	  a	  claim	  against	  the	  state	  that	  displaced	  
them	  –	  state	  B,	  in	  our	  example	  –	  that	  it	  assists	  them	  in	  achieving	  stable	  legal	  
residence	  in	  one	  or	  another	  (legitimate?)	  state.	  	  While	  state	  B	  may	  discharge	  its	  duty	  
to	  the	  stateless	  descendants	  of	  those	  it	  displaced	  by	  admitting	  them	  to	  its	  territory	  
as	  full	  citizens,	  it	  may	  also	  do	  so	  by	  arranging	  for	  another	  state	  to	  grant	  them	  stable	  
legal	  residence	  in	  its	  territory.	  	  After	  all,	  the	  descendants	  of	  the	  displaced	  have	  never	  
resided	  in	  the	  territory	  from	  which	  their	  forebears	  were	  expelled,	  nor	  is	  legal	  
residence	  within	  that	  particular	  territory	  fundamental	  to	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  
structure	  of	  their	  personal	  relationships,	  goals,	  and	  pursuits.	  Stilz’s	  account	  of	  the	  
right	  of	  occupancy,	  therefore,	  provides	  no	  basis	  for	  the	  claim	  that	  they	  have	  a	  right	  
to	  establish	  stable	  legal	  residence	  in	  the	  particular	  territory	  their	  forebears	  once	  
occupied.20	  
	   In	  practice,	  it	  may	  be	  that	  state	  B	  can	  only	  discharge	  its	  duty	  to	  the	  stateless	  
descendants	  of	  those	  it	  forcibly	  displaced	  by	  granting	  them	  residence	  as	  full	  citizens	  
in	  its	  own	  territory.	  	  We	  should	  be	  careful	  not	  to	  jump	  to	  this	  conclusion	  too	  quickly,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  This	  supposition	  is	  necessary	  because	  lax	  enforcement	  of	  the	  law	  may	  enable	  individuals	  to	  form	  
and	  pursue	  conceptions	  of	  the	  good	  as	  if	  they	  enjoyed	  stable	  legal	  residence	  in	  the	  territory	  governed	  
by	  a	  particular	  state.	  	  Whether	  these	  individuals	  thereby	  acquire	  an	  occupancy	  right	  in	  that	  state’s	  
territory	  is	  an	  interesting	  question,	  but	  not	  one	  I	  will	  pursue	  here.	  
20	  Admittedly,	  Stilz	  only	  identifies	  the	  conditions	  that	  together	  constitute	  the	  occupation	  principle	  as	  
jointly	  sufficient,	  but	  not	  necessary,	  for	  the	  enjoyment	  of	  a	  right	  of	  occupancy.	  	  It	  remains	  open	  to	  her,	  
therefore,	  to	  argue	  that	  these	  conditions	  do	  not	  apply	  in	  the	  case	  of	  descendants	  who	  have	  failed	  to	  
achieve	  full	  and	  equal	  citizenship	  elsewhere.	  	  Presumably	  a	  defense	  of	  a	  right	  of	  return	  on	  the	  part	  of	  
such	  individuals	  will	  need	  to	  avoid	  implying	  a	  right	  of	  return	  for	  those	  who	  have	  achieved	  stable	  legal	  
residence	  elsewhere.	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however.	  	  For	  it	  may	  be	  that	  some	  states	  would	  be	  willing	  to	  grant	  these	  individuals	  
stable	  legal	  residence	  in	  their	  territory	  in	  exchange	  for	  money,	  resources,	  favorable	  
trade	  terms,	  or	  even	  some	  of	  state	  B’s	  territory	  (which	  may	  not	  include	  any	  of	  the	  
territory	  state	  B	  seized	  from	  state	  A).	  	  Moreover,	  suppose	  Stilz	  is	  right	  to	  maintain	  
that	  other	  states	  may	  justly	  pressure	  state	  B	  to	  fulfill	  its	  duty	  to	  the	  stateless	  
descendants	  of	  those	  it	  displaced	  (586).	  	  Third	  party	  states	  may	  do	  so	  more	  
effectively	  and	  at	  less	  cost	  by,	  for	  example,	  seizing	  some	  of	  state	  B’s	  assets	  abroad	  
and	  using	  them	  to	  negotiate	  for	  stable	  legal	  residence	  for	  these	  individuals	  in	  a	  state	  
other	  than	  state	  B.	  	  The	  foregoing	  argument	  entails	  that	  this	  would	  be	  a	  fully	  
appropriate	  solution	  to	  the	  injustice	  suffered	  by	  these	  stateless	  individuals,	  not	  a	  
merely	  second	  best	  one.	  	  Regardless	  of	  what	  the	  practical	  consequences	  might	  be,	  
the	  theoretical	  point	  remains:	  properly	  understood,	  the	  argument	  for	  occupancy	  
and	  the	  right	  thereto	  does	  not	  entail	  that	  stateless	  descendants	  of	  those	  unjustly	  
displaced	  from	  a	  particular	  territory	  enjoy	  a	  right	  of	  return	  to	  it.	  	  
	   Thus	  far	  in	  this	  section	  I	  have	  focused	  on	  clarifying	  the	  implications	  that	  
Stilz’s	  account	  of	  occupancy	  has	  for	  the	  descendants	  of	  those	  unjustly	  displaced	  
from	  territory	  T.	  	  These	  clarifications	  also	  highlight	  an	  implication	  of	  Stilz’s	  view	  for	  
those	  who	  actually	  suffer	  the	  injustice	  of	  forcible	  expulsion	  from	  T,	  namely	  that	  they	  
may	  cease	  to	  have	  occupancy	  rights	  in	  T	  and	  so	  have	  no	  right	  of	  return	  to	  it.	  	  As	  we	  
have	  seen,	  Stilz	  maintains	  that	  a	  person’s	  right	  to	  occupy	  a	  territory	  depends	  on	  
legal	  residence	  within	  that	  territory	  being	  fundamental	  to	  the	  integrity	  of	  his	  
structure	  of	  personal	  relationships,	  goals,	  and	  pursuits.	  	  That	  is	  why	  she	  concludes	  
that	  descendants	  of	  the	  displaced	  who	  have	  achieved	  full	  and	  equal	  citizenship	  in	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another	  state	  have	  no	  right	  of	  return;	  legal	  residence	  in	  the	  territory	  from	  which	  
their	  forebears	  were	  expelled	  is	  not	  fundamental	  to	  their	  life	  plans.	  	  Yet	  the	  same	  
may	  come	  to	  be	  true	  of	  those	  forcibly	  displaced	  from	  a	  particular	  territory.	  	  If	  they	  
achieve	  stable	  legal	  residence	  elsewhere	  and	  begin	  to	  form	  and	  pursue	  a	  conception	  
of	  the	  good	  premised	  on	  that	  fact,	  then	  over	  time	  legal	  residence	  in	  the	  territory	  
from	  which	  they	  were	  expelled	  will	  likely	  cease	  to	  be	  fundamental	  to	  the	  integrity	  of	  
their	  life	  plans.	  	  While	  Stilz	  writes	  that	  the	  descendants	  of	  the	  Germans	  forced	  out	  of	  
what	  is	  now	  western	  Poland	  in	  1945	  have	  no	  right	  to	  return	  there	  (586),	  her	  
account	  of	  the	  right	  of	  occupancy	  suggests	  a	  stronger	  conclusion,	  namely	  that	  even	  
many	  of	  the	  Germans	  expelled	  from	  western	  Poland	  likely	  lost	  their	  claim	  to	  return	  
within	  a	  few	  decades	  of	  their	  expulsion.	  	  Properly	  understood,	  then,	  Stilz’s	  account	  
of	  the	  right	  of	  occupancy	  entails	  that	  even	  those	  forcibly	  expelled	  from	  a	  territory	  
may	  have	  their	  right	  to	  return	  to	  it	  superseded.	  	  Moreover,	  and	  contrary	  to	  Stilz’s	  
assertion,	  it	  follows	  that	  those	  who	  unjustly	  expelled	  them,	  or	  who	  are	  at	  fault	  for	  
taking	  advantage	  of	  their	  expulsion	  to	  settle	  in	  that	  territory,	  can	  acquire	  a	  right	  to	  
occupy	  it.	  	  Or	  so	  I	  will	  now	  argue.	  
The	  no-­‐fault	  condition	  for	  occupancy	  rights	  
On	  Stilz’s	  occupation	  principle,	  a	  person	  enjoys	  a	  right	  to	  occupy	  a	  territory	  
only	  if	  “his	  connection	  to	  that	  particular	  territory	  was	  formed	  through	  no	  fault	  of	  his	  
own”	  (585).	  	  The	  inclusion	  of	  what	  I	  will	  call	  the	  no-­‐fault	  condition	  among	  those	  that	  
must	  be	  met	  if	  a	  person	  is	  to	  enjoy	  a	  right	  to	  occupy	  a	  particular	  territory	  serves	  two	  
purposes.	  	  First,	  it	  prohibits	  those	  who	  establish	  residence	  in	  that	  territory	  by	  
culpably	  displacing	  those	  who	  previously	  occupied	  it,	  or	  who	  culpably	  take	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advantage	  of	  others’	  unjust	  displacement	  of	  the	  previous	  inhabitants	  to	  settle	  in	  it,	  
from	  acquiring	  a	  right	  to	  occupy	  that	  territory.	  	  This	  is	  so	  even	  if	  they	  have	  enjoyed	  
stable	  legal	  residence	  in	  that	  territory	  (albeit	  in	  all	  likelihood	  under	  a	  different	  legal	  
regime	  than	  the	  one	  that	  structured	  the	  affairs	  of	  the	  previous	  occupiers)	  for	  a	  long	  
enough	  time	  that	  the	  integrity	  of	  their	  structures	  of	  personal	  relationships,	  goals,	  
and	  pursuits	  depends	  upon	  continued	  legal	  residence	  there.	  	  Second,	  the	  no-­‐fault	  
condition	  does	  not	  similarly	  disqualify	  the	  children	  of	  these	  wrongdoers	  who	  are	  
not	  culpable	  for	  their	  presence	  in	  the	  territory,	  either	  because	  they	  were	  too	  young	  
to	  be	  held	  morally	  responsible	  for	  settling	  in	  the	  territory	  when	  they	  did	  so,	  or	  
because	  they	  were	  born	  there.	  	  If	  these	  individuals	  proceed	  to	  form	  and	  pursue	  
conceptions	  of	  the	  good	  structured	  by	  stable	  legal	  residence	  in	  that	  territory,	  then	  
they	  do	  acquire	  a	  right	  to	  occupy	  it.	  
Each	  of	  these	  implications	  of	  the	  no-­‐fault	  condition	  may	  appear	  to	  enjoy	  
some	  intuitive	  support.	  	  If	  I	  steal	  your	  car,	  then	  surely	  I	  cannot	  gain	  rightful	  
possession	  of	  it	  no	  matter	  how	  long	  I	  drive	  it,	  or	  how	  much	  I	  may	  build	  my	  life	  plans	  
around	  the	  assumption	  that	  I	  will	  continue	  to	  possess	  it.	  	  True,	  you	  may	  severely	  
disrupt	  my	  life	  plans	  when	  you	  (or	  the	  state)	  reclaim	  your	  car	  from	  me,	  but	  I	  could	  
have	  avoided	  that	  disruption	  by	  not	  stealing	  your	  car	  (or	  by	  not	  making	  any	  plans	  
premised	  on	  the	  possession	  or	  use	  of	  it),	  and	  I	  should	  have	  known	  this.	  	  Those	  who	  
have	  this	  intuition	  in	  the	  case	  of	  property	  may	  well	  draw	  an	  analogous	  conclusion	  in	  
the	  case	  of	  occupancy	  rights.	  	  Even	  if	  righting	  the	  wrong	  the	  unjust	  displacers	  
committed	  severely	  disrupts	  their	  life	  plans,	  say	  because	  it	  requires	  them	  to	  leave	  
the	  territory	  in	  question,	  they	  could	  have	  avoided	  that	  disruption	  by	  not	  invading	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the	  territory	  and	  unjustly	  displacing	  the	  previous	  inhabitants,	  and	  they	  should	  have	  
known	  this.	  	  The	  same	  is	  not	  true	  for	  the	  non-­‐culpable	  children	  of	  the	  wrongdoers,	  
however.	  	  To	  severely	  disrupt	  their	  life	  plans,	  say	  by	  expelling	  them	  from	  the	  
territory	  in	  which	  they	  have	  grown	  up,	  would	  be	  to	  punish	  the	  children	  for	  the	  sins	  
of	  their	  fathers	  (and	  mothers).	  	  	  
Despite	  the	  initial	  intuitive	  appeal	  of	  the	  no-­‐fault	  condition	  on	  an	  individual’s	  
enjoyment	  of	  a	  right	  to	  occupy	  a	  particular	  territory,	  we	  ought	  to	  reject	  it.	  	  Moral	  
fault,	  or	  culpability,	  makes	  no	  difference	  to	  whether	  a	  person	  successfully	  acquires	  a	  
right	  to	  something,	  including	  a	  right	  to	  occupy	  a	  particular	  territory.	  	  Rather,	  moral	  
fault	  or	  culpability	  figures	  in	  the	  justifiability	  or	  appropriateness	  of	  blame,	  and	  
perhaps	  also	  punishment	  and	  liability	  to	  remedy	  wrongdoing	  or	  compensate	  for	  
harm	  done.	  	  For	  example,	  suppose	  I	  take	  your	  jacket,	  reasonably	  but	  mistakenly	  
believing	  it	  to	  be	  my	  own.	  	  Since	  I	  am	  not	  morally	  at	  fault	  for	  violating	  your	  property	  
right	  in	  your	  jacket,	  I	  ought	  not	  to	  be	  blamed	  or	  (I	  will	  assume)	  punished	  for	  doing	  
so.	  	  The	  absence	  of	  culpability	  on	  my	  part	  does	  not	  empower	  me	  to	  change	  the	  
existing	  structure	  of	  rights,	  however;	  you	  continue	  to	  enjoy	  a	  property	  right	  in	  your	  
jacket,	  one	  that	  correlates	  to	  a	  duty	  on	  my	  part	  to	  return	  the	  jacket	  to	  you.	  	  Of	  
course,	  you	  may	  cease	  to	  have	  a	  right	  to	  the	  jacket	  if	  you	  voluntarily	  abandon	  your	  
claim	  to	  it,	  or	  of	  particular	  relevance	  here,	  if	  my	  claim	  to	  the	  jacket	  supersedes	  
yours.	  	  As	  I	  will	  now	  demonstrate,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  right	  of	  occupancy	  supersession	  
turns	  on	  the	  original	  right-­‐holder	  no	  longer	  meeting	  the	  first	  two	  conditions	  for	  a	  
right	  of	  occupancy	  in	  the	  particular	  territory	  in	  question,	  while	  the	  subsequent	  
inhabitant	  does.	  	  The	  fault,	  or	  lack	  thereof,	  of	  those	  who	  subsequently	  occupy	  that	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territory	  makes	  no	  difference	  to	  the	  supersession	  of	  the	  original	  right-­‐holders’	  
claims,	  or	  to	  the	  subsequent	  inhabitants’	  acquisition	  of	  a	  right	  to	  occupy	  that	  
territory.	  	  In	  short,	  we	  ought	  to	  replace	  Stilz’s	  no-­‐fault	  condition	  with	  one	  that	  
makes	  the	  enjoyment	  of	  a	  right	  to	  occupy	  a	  particular	  territory	  conditional	  on	  
occupancy	  not	  constituting	  a	  violation	  of	  other	  agents’	  rights.21	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Consider,	  first,	  the	  claim	  that	  those	  who	  unjustly	  displace	  the	  original	  
inhabitants	  of	  T	  cannot	  acquire	  a	  right	  to	  occupy	  it,	  even	  if	  they	  legally	  reside	  there	  
for	  a	  long	  time	  and	  their	  life	  plans	  come	  to	  reflect	  that	  fact.	  	  Why	  should	  the	  fact	  that	  
a	  person’s	  connection	  to	  a	  particular	  territory	  was	  formed	  via	  some	  morally	  faulty	  
act	  bar	  her	  from	  ever	  enjoying	  an	  occupancy	  right	  there?	  	  Admittedly,	  we	  tend	  to	  
think	  that	  a	  person	  who	  first	  acquires	  something	  via	  a	  morally	  faulty	  act	  has	  no	  
claim	  to	  it	  subsequently.	  	  But	  I	  suspect	  that	  is	  because	  we	  typically	  assume	  that	  the	  
original	  possessor	  continues	  to	  have	  a	  rightful	  claim	  to	  it.	  	  That	  is,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  initial	  
act	  of	  unjust	  acquisition	  but	  the	  current	  act	  of	  unjust	  possession	  that	  leads	  us	  to	  
conclude	  that	  this	  person	  has	  no	  moral	  title	  to	  the	  thing	  in	  question.	  	  If	  the	  initial	  
possessor	  ceases	  to	  have	  a	  right	  to	  the	  thing,	  however,	  then	  the	  way	  is	  open	  to	  the	  
initially	  unjust	  acquirer	  to	  establish	  rightful	  possession	  of	  it.	  	  She	  will	  succeed	  in	  
doing	  so	  just	  in	  case	  she	  meets	  the	  conditions	  for	  rightful	  possession	  of	  that	  thing,	  
which	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  right	  to	  occupy	  a	  particular	  territory	  T	  involves	  actual	  or	  
recent	  residence	  in	  T	  and	  a	  structure	  of	  personal	  relationships,	  goals,	  and	  pursuits	  
that	  depends	  for	  its	  integrity	  on	  continued	  legal	  residence	  in	  T.	  	  Earlier	  I	  argued	  that	  
if	  those	  unjustly	  displaced	  from	  territory	  T	  have	  established	  stable	  legal	  residence	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  As	  I	  explain	  below,	  those	  rights	  may	  be	  either	  rights	  of	  occupancy	  or	  rights	  to	  political	  self-­‐
determination.	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elsewhere,	  and	  their	  life	  plans	  largely	  reflect	  that	  fact,	  then	  they	  no	  longer	  have	  any	  
claim	  to	  occupy	  the	  territory	  from	  which	  they	  were	  unjustly	  expelled.	  	  If	  so,	  then	  T	  is	  
available	  for	  occupation,	  and	  it	  is	  the	  displacers	  who	  now	  reside	  in	  T,	  and	  who	  have	  
formed	  and	  pursued	  life	  plans	  premised	  on	  stable	  legal	  residence	  there,	  that	  meet	  
the	  conditions	  for	  rightful	  occupancy	  of	  T.	  	  Thus	  if	  as	  I	  previously	  suggested	  the	  
Germans	  forcibly	  expelled	  from	  what	  is	  now	  western	  Poland	  did	  in	  fact	  lose	  their	  
right	  of	  occupancy	  in	  that	  territory,	  and	  so	  their	  right	  of	  return	  to	  it,	  within	  a	  few	  
decades,	  then	  those	  Poles	  who	  participated	  in	  the	  expulsion	  of	  these	  Germans	  and	  
who	  then	  settled	  in	  that	  territory	  acquired	  a	  right	  to	  occupy	  it	  (so	  that,	  had	  Poland	  
met	  the	  conditions	  for	  legitimacy	  Stilz	  sets	  out,	  it	  would	  have	  enjoyed	  a	  territorial	  
right	  to	  that	  region).	  
It	  bears	  emphasizing	  that	  on	  the	  foregoing	  account	  it	  is	  not	  the	  unjust	  
displacers’	  wrongful	  seizure	  of	  territory	  T	  that	  generates	  a	  rightful	  claim	  to	  occupy	  
it.	  	  Rather,	  as	  long	  as	  the	  unjust	  displacers’	  residence	  in	  T	  constitutes	  a	  violation	  of	  
the	  occupancy	  rights	  of	  those	  they	  have	  unjustly	  displaced,	  their	  residence	  and	  
pursuit	  of	  conceptions	  of	  the	  good	  premised	  on	  stable	  legal	  residence	  there	  generate	  
no	  claim	  to	  occupancy	  in	  it.	  	  Only	  when	  the	  occupancy	  rights	  of	  those	  they	  have	  
forcibly	  displaced	  lapse	  do	  the	  displacers’	  de	  facto	  stable	  legal	  residence	  in	  T	  
generate	  an	  entitlement	  to	  stable	  legal	  residence	  there.	  	  Rightful	  occupation,	  then,	  
does	  not	  depend	  upon	  rightful	  original	  acquisition.	  	  Note,	  however,	  that	  the	  unjust	  
displacers’	  acquisition	  of	  a	  right	  of	  occupancy	  in	  T	  does	  not	  necessarily	  entail	  the	  
impermissibility	  of	  punishing	  them	  for	  the	  injustices	  they	  committed	  when	  they	  first	  
forcibly	  displaced	  the	  previous	  inhabitants	  of	  T,	  and	  when	  they	  failed	  to	  discharge	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their	  remedial	  duties	  to	  those	  individuals.	  	  Whether	  punishment	  would	  actually	  be	  
justifiable	  in	  such	  cases,	  and	  if	  so	  what	  form	  it	  ought	  to	  take,	  are	  questions	  that	  lie	  
beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  paper.	  	  
It	  might	  be	  objected	  that	  the	  speed	  with	  which	  individuals’	  rights	  of	  
occupancy	  can	  be	  superseded,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  duty	  to	  grant	  the	  
descendants	  of	  the	  displaced	  full	  citizenship	  and	  residence	  in	  the	  territory	  from	  
which	  their	  forebears	  were	  expelled,	  will	  encourage	  unjust	  expulsions	  of	  people	  
from	  territories	  in	  which	  they	  have	  a	  right	  to	  enjoy	  stable	  legal	  residence.	  	  After	  all,	  
those	  tempted	  to	  engage	  in	  such	  acts	  will	  know	  that	  their	  control	  over	  the	  territory	  
they	  seize	  may	  well	  become	  morally	  legitimate	  within	  one	  generation,	  and	  perhaps	  
even	  sooner.	  	  Yet	  it	  seems	  unlikely	  that	  there	  will	  be	  any	  actors	  for	  whom	  this	  
consideration	  tips	  the	  balance	  in	  favor	  of	  unjustly	  seizing	  a	  territory	  and	  expelling	  
its	  current	  population.	  	  Moreover,	  it	  may	  be	  possible	  to	  justify	  international	  legal	  
rules	  regarding	  legitimate	  control	  over	  territory	  that	  deviate	  to	  some	  extent	  from	  
the	  correct	  account	  of	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  states	  enjoy	  a	  moral	  right	  to	  
exercise	  jurisdiction	  over	  a	  given	  territory.	  	  For	  example,	  if	  law	  serves	  to	  mediate	  
between	  agents	  and	  the	  reasons	  that	  apply	  to	  them,	  then	  law	  may	  justly	  deviate	  
from	  a	  moral	  norm	  in	  some	  cases	  if	  in	  doing	  so	  it	  produces	  greater	  overall	  
compliance	  with	  that	  norm.	  	  International	  law,	  then,	  might	  refuse	  to	  recognize	  a	  
state’s	  claim	  to	  rule	  a	  piece	  of	  territory	  it	  unjustly	  seized	  and	  whose	  inhabitants	  it	  
displaced	  for	  at	  least	  two	  generations,	  say,	  if	  doing	  so	  led	  to	  greater	  respect	  for	  
states’	  morally	  justified	  claims	  to	  territory	  and	  for	  individuals’	  rights	  of	  occupancy	  
than	  if	  the	  law	  mirrored	  exactly	  the	  moral	  account	  of	  occupancy	  rights	  (and	  so	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territorial	  rights)	  described	  here.	  	  	  If	  that	  account	  ought	  to	  be	  rejected,	  it	  is	  not	  
because	  of	  the	  wrongs	  it	  might	  tempt	  people	  to	  commit,	  but	  because	  it	  provides	  a	  
flawed	  understanding	  of	  the	  considerations	  that	  morally	  entitle	  individuals	  to	  reside	  
in,	  and	  states	  to	  govern,	  particular	  pieces	  of	  territory.	  
Recall,	  now,	  the	  no-­‐fault	  condition’s	  second	  implication,	  namely	  that	  the	  non-­‐
culpable	  children	  of	  those	  who	  unjustly	  displaced	  the	  original	  inhabitants	  can	  
acquire	  rights	  of	  occupancy	  in	  T.	  	  There	  is	  reason	  to	  be	  skeptical	  of	  this	  conclusion	  
too.	  	  Suppose	  the	  previous	  inhabitants	  of	  T	  constitute	  a	  political	  people	  (or	  some	  
portion	  thereof),	  a	  status	  in	  virtue	  of	  which	  Stilz	  maintains	  they	  enjoy	  a	  right	  to	  
political	  self-­‐determination.22	  	  Suppose,	  further,	  that	  their	  right	  to	  political	  self-­‐
determination	  gives	  them	  a	  defeasible	  claim	  to	  control	  entry	  into	  T,	  and	  in	  
particular,	  a	  defeasible	  right	  to	  deny	  outsiders	  the	  opportunity	  to	  establish	  the	  sort	  
of	  long-­‐term	  residence	  in	  T	  that	  is	  necessary	  if	  individuals	  are	  to	  acquire	  an	  
occupancy	  right	  in	  T.23	  	  Non-­‐culpable	  settlers	  in	  T	  violate	  that	  right	  just	  as	  much	  as	  
culpable	  ones	  do	  –	  they	  all	  construct	  a	  life	  plan	  premised	  on	  stable	  legal	  residence	  in	  
T	  without	  permission	  from	  those	  with	  a	  justified	  claim	  to	  control	  who	  may	  establish	  
long-­‐term	  residence	  there.	  	  Though	  the	  former	  deserve	  neither	  blame	  nor	  
punishment	  for	  doing	  so,	  this	  does	  not	  change	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  have	  lived	  their	  
lives	  in	  a	  place	  they	  are	  not	  entitled	  to	  live.	  	  If	  the	  original	  inhabitants	  of	  T	  do	  not	  
establish	  stable	  legal	  residence	  elsewhere	  (so	  that	  they	  continue	  to	  enjoy	  a	  right	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Stilz	  characterizes	  a	  political	  people	  as	  a	  group	  that	  “has	  established	  a	  history	  of	  political	  
cooperation	  together	  by	  sharing	  a	  state	  (legitimate	  or	  otherwise)	  in	  the	  recent	  past,	  and…	  possesses	  
the	  ability	  to	  reconstitute	  a	  legitimate	  state	  on	  their	  territory	  today”	  (591).	  	  
23	  The	  right	  is	  defeabile	  insofar	  as	  it	  does	  not	  entitle	  those	  who	  have	  it	  to	  refuse	  entry	  to	  outsiders	  
who	  cannot	  otherwise	  securely	  enjoy	  their	  basic	  moral	  rights.	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occupy	  T),	  and	  if	  they	  continue	  to	  constitute	  a	  political	  people	  (so	  that	  they	  enjoy	  a	  
right	  to	  political	  self-­‐determination,	  including	  control	  over	  entry	  into	  the	  territory	  
they	  have	  a	  right	  to	  rule),	  then	  when	  they	  regain	  control	  over	  T	  they	  have	  the	  right	  
to	  expel	  from	  it	  even	  the	  non-­‐culpable	  settlers.24	  
The	  expulsion	  of	  the	  non-­‐culpable	  settlers	  may	  well	  seriously	  damage	  the	  
integrity	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  personal	  relationships,	  goals,	  and	  pursuits	  they	  have	  
built	  against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  stable	  legal	  residence	  in	  territory	  T.	  	  Responsibility	  for	  
the	  wrong	  done	  to	  them,	  however,	  lies	  with	  those	  at	  fault	  for	  making	  the	  non-­‐
culpable	  settlers	  morally	  vulnerable	  to	  this	  kind	  of	  severe	  disruption	  to	  their	  life	  
plans;	  typically,	  the	  same	  agents	  at	  fault	  for	  the	  original	  unjust	  annexation	  of	  T	  and	  
the	  forcible	  displacement	  of	  those	  with	  a	  right	  to	  occupy	  it.25	  	  These	  agents	  have	  a	  
duty	  to	  remedy	  the	  injustice	  they	  have	  done	  to	  those	  who	  non-­‐culpably	  settled	  in	  T,	  
and	  to	  compensate	  them	  as	  best	  they	  can	  for	  the	  harm	  they	  will	  inevitably	  suffer	  as	  a	  
result	  of	  having	  to	  relocate.	  	  If	  they	  refuse	  or	  are	  unable	  to	  do	  so,	  then	  the	  original	  
inhabitants	  of	  T	  –	  i.e.	  those	  with	  occupancy	  rights	  in	  T	  who	  together	  constitute	  a	  
political	  people	  entitled	  to	  exercise	  political	  self-­‐determination	  in	  T	  –	  may	  not	  
render	  them	  stateless.	  	  Instead,	  they	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  work	  with	  other	  states	  to	  help	  
the	  non-­‐culpable	  settlers	  achieve	  stable	  legal	  residence	  somewhere,	  possibly	  but	  not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  The	  most	  commonly	  cited	  reason	  for	  exercising	  such	  a	  right	  is	  the	  desire	  to	  maintain	  a	  particular	  
kind	  of	  culture	  (e.g.	  political,	  religious,	  social,	  or	  economic,	  or	  some	  combination	  thereof)	  that	  is	  
likely	  to	  be	  threatened	  if	  the	  non-­‐culpable	  descendants	  of	  the	  displacers	  are	  permitted	  to	  remain	  (as	  
full	  and	  equal	  citizens)	  in	  territory	  T.	  	  See,	  e.g.,	  Miller,	  ‘Territorial	  Rights,’	  265.	  	  	  
If	  the	  unjustly	  displaced	  original	  inhabitants	  of	  T	  acquire	  occupancy	  rights	  elsewhere,	  then	  the	  non-­‐
culpable	  settlers	  in	  T	  may	  acquire	  a	  right	  to	  occupy	  it,	  on	  the	  same	  grounds	  as	  I	  set	  out	  earlier	  for	  
those	  morally	  at	  fault	  for	  expelling	  the	  original	  inhabitants	  or	  for	  settling	  in	  T.	  
25	  Analogously	  (and	  all	  else	  equal),	  the	  imprisonment	  of	  a	  convicted	  (and	  truly	  guilty)	  thief	  may	  well	  
damage	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  her	  children’s	  relationships,	  goals,	  and	  pursuits,	  but	  
responsibility	  for	  the	  harm	  they	  suffer	  lies	  with	  the	  thief,	  not	  the	  state	  or	  the	  political	  community	  on	  
whose	  behalf	  it	  acts.	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necessarily	  in	  territory	  T.	  	  The	  duty	  here	  is	  a	  general	  one	  incumbent	  upon	  all	  states,	  
not	  a	  special	  obligation	  owed	  by	  those	  with	  a	  rightful	  claim	  to	  rule	  T	  to	  those	  who,	  
through	  no	  fault	  of	  their	  own,	  built	  their	  life	  plans	  around	  stable	  legal	  residence	  in	  a	  
territory	  they	  are	  not	  entitled	  to	  occupy.	  	  	  	  
Suppose,	  however,	  that	  those	  originally	  displaced	  from	  T	  have	  died,	  and	  that	  
their	  descendants	  have	  failed	  to	  acquire	  occupancy	  rights	  in	  another	  state’s	  
territory.	  	  Suppose,	  further,	  that	  the	  state	  that	  displaced	  their	  forebears	  is	  compelled	  
to	  admit	  the	  descendants	  of	  the	  displaced	  to	  T.	  	  Stilz	  maintains	  that	  the	  descendants	  
of	  those	  displaced	  have	  no	  right	  to	  expel	  the	  non-­‐culpable	  descendants	  of	  those	  who	  
did	  the	  displacing.	  	  I	  agree;	  the	  non-­‐culpable	  descendants	  of	  the	  displacers	  have	  a	  
right	  of	  occupancy	  in	  the	  territory	  in	  question.	  	  They	  have	  that	  right,	  however,	  not	  
because	  they	  are	  not	  at	  fault	  for	  forming	  and	  pursuing	  a	  conception	  of	  the	  good	  
premised	  on	  stable	  legal	  residence	  in	  this	  territory.	  	  Rather,	  they	  have	  that	  right	  
because	  they	  have	  formed	  and	  pursued	  a	  conception	  of	  the	  good	  premised	  on	  stable	  
legal	  residence	  in	  this	  territory	  and	  no	  other	  agents	  have	  rights	  over	  that	  territory	  
that	  precludes	  their	  doing	  so.	  	  The	  original	  inhabitants	  of	  the	  territory,	  who	  may	  well	  
have	  had	  such	  rights	  for	  at	  least	  some	  period	  of	  time	  after	  their	  expulsion,	  have	  all	  
died,	  or	  so	  I	  am	  assuming.	  	  Their	  descendants,	  who	  have	  never	  resided	  in	  the	  
territory	  in	  question,	  do	  not	  have	  occupancy	  rights	  in	  it;	  rather,	  as	  I	  argued	  above,	  if	  
they	  are	  stateless	  they	  have	  a	  claim	  against	  the	  state	  that	  displaced	  their	  forebears	  
that	  it	  assist	  them	  in	  achieving	  stable	  legal	  residence	  somewhere.	  	  Even	  if,	  in	  
practice,	  the	  displacing	  state	  can	  only	  do	  so	  by	  granting	  them	  full	  citizenship	  and	  
residence	  in	  the	  territory	  from	  which	  it	  expelled	  their	  ancestors,	  the	  moral	  claim	  the	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descendants	  of	  the	  displaced	  have	  against	  the	  displacing	  state	  does	  not	  preclude	  the	  
displacers’	  descendants	  from	  acquiring	  occupancy	  rights	  in	  T.	  
My	  aim	  in	  the	  preceding	  paragraphs	  has	  been	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  
absence	  of	  fault	  for	  forming	  a	  connection	  to	  a	  particular	  territory	  does	  not	  entail	  
that	  one	  enjoys	  a	  right	  to	  occupy	  that	  territory	  as	  long	  as	  one	  resides	  in	  it	  and	  legal	  
residence	  there	  is	  central	  to	  one’s	  life	  plans.26	  	  Together	  with	  the	  earlier	  argument	  
defending	  the	  claim	  that	  those	  at	  fault	  for	  forming	  a	  connection	  to	  a	  particular	  
territory	  (e.g.	  those	  who	  unjustly	  displaced	  its	  original	  inhabitants)	  may	  nonetheless	  
acquire	  a	  right	  to	  occupy	  it,	  this	  demonstration	  provides	  a	  compelling	  case	  for	  
replacing	  the	  no-­‐fault	  condition	  on	  the	  enjoyment	  of	  a	  right	  of	  occupancy	  with	  a	  no	  
rights	  violation	  condition.	  	  
Where	  does	  this	  leave	  us?	  
	   Having	  clarified	  and	  corrected	  Stilz’s	  proposed	  occupation	  principle,	  we	  can	  
use	  it	  to	  give	  an	  account	  of	  what	  gives	  a	  (legitimate)	  state	  a	  right	  to	  jurisdiction	  over	  
a	  particular	  territory,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  account	  of	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  such	  a	  
right	  persists,	  or	  fails	  to	  persist,	  in	  the	  face	  of	  its	  violation.	  	  But	  is	  it	  a	  plausible	  
account?	  	  I	  am	  not	  yet	  ready	  to	  answer	  that	  question.	  	  However,	  I	  think	  it	  likely	  that	  
the	  revisions	  to	  the	  occupation	  principle	  for	  which	  I	  have	  argued	  increase	  the	  extent	  
to	  which	  the	  principle’s	  implications	  conflict	  with	  what	  strike	  me	  as	  fairly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  David	  Miller	  (rightly)	  objects	  to	  Stilz’s	  formulation	  of	  the	  occupation	  principle	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  
“being	  the	  legitimate	  representative	  of	  people	  who,	  as	  individuals,	  have	  the	  right	  to	  be	  on	  that	  
territory”	  does	  not	  suffice	  to	  establish	  a	  state’s	  right	  to	  rule	  that	  territory	  “because	  there	  may	  be	  an	  
alternative	  state	  with	  a	  better	  claim	  waiting	  in	  the	  wings,	  so	  to	  speak	  –	  the	  state	  that	  represents	  the	  
people	  who	  suffered	  the	  injustice	  of	  expulsion”	  (Miller,	  ‘Territorial	  Rights,’	  256).	  	  The	  revised	  version	  
of	  the	  occupation	  principle	  I	  defend	  in	  the	  text	  does	  not	  suffer	  the	  same	  shortcoming;	  rather,	  it	  holds	  
that	  culpable	  or	  non-­‐culpable	  settlers	  of	  a	  territory	  from	  which	  others	  were	  unjustly	  displaced	  can	  
acquire	  a	  right	  to	  occupy	  that	  territory	  only	  if	  the	  occupancy	  rights	  of	  those	  displaced	  from	  it	  have	  
lapsed	  (i.e.	  there	  is	  no	  agent	  with	  a	  right	  to	  occupy	  the	  territory	  waiting	  in	  the	  wings).	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widespread	  intuitions	  regarding	  just	  claims	  to	  territory.	  	  I	  have	  in	  mind	  here	  the	  
following	  claims:	  (1)	  that	  those	  who	  unjustly	  displace	  the	  rightful	  occupiers	  of	  a	  
territory	  can	  come	  to	  enjoy	  a	  right	  to	  occupy	  that	  territory	  themselves;	  (2)	  that	  non-­‐
culpable	  occupiers	  of	  a	  territory	  may,	  in	  the	  right	  circumstances,	  be	  justly	  displaced	  
from	  the	  territory	  on	  which	  they	  have	  built	  their	  lives;	  and	  (3)	  that	  the	  descendants	  
of	  those	  unjustly	  displaced	  from	  a	  given	  territory	  have	  no	  right	  of	  return	  to	  it.	  	  Our	  
willingness	  to	  accept	  these	  conclusions	  will	  depend	  to	  a	  considerable	  extent	  on	  
whether	  we	  believe	  that	  the	  contribution	  that	  stable	  legal,	  or	  at	  least	  social	  norm	  
governed,	  residence	  makes	  to	  the	  living	  of	  an	  autonomous	  life	  is	  all	  that	  grounds	  a	  
right	  to	  occupy	  a	  particular	  territory.27	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Consider,	  in	  this	  vein	  and	  as	  a	  starting	  off	  point	  for	  discussion,	  the	  following	  question:	  according	  to	  
Stilz,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  descendants	  of	  those	  unjustly	  displaced	  from	  territory	  T	  enjoy	  stable	  legal	  
residence	  in	  the	  state	  in	  which	  they	  currently	  reside	  entails	  that	  they	  have	  no	  right	  of	  return	  to	  the	  
territory	  from	  which	  their	  forebears	  were	  expelled.	  	  Though	  these	  people	  may	  lead	  autonomous	  
lives,	  the	  way	  of	  life	  they	  lead	  may	  not	  be	  the	  way	  of	  life	  they	  would	  most	  like	  to	  lead,	  namely	  the	  way	  
of	  life	  their	  forebears	  led.	  	  If,	  plausibly,	  they	  would	  be	  leading	  that	  life	  in	  territory	  T	  had	  their	  
forebears	  not	  been	  forcibly	  displaced	  from	  it,	  then	  why	  think	  it	  merely	  unfortunate,	  but	  not	  unjust,	  
that	  they	  are	  unable	  to	  lead	  this	  way	  of	  life?	  	  Note	  that	  what	  is	  at	  issue	  here	  is	  not	  a	  right	  to	  the	  
conditions	  in	  which	  one	  can	  lead	  whatever	  way	  of	  life	  one	  most	  aspires	  to	  lead,	  but	  only	  a	  right	  not	  to	  
be	  deprived	  of	  those	  conditions	  by	  others’	  unjust	  conduct.	  	  Perhaps	  it	  is	  not	  merely	  forming	  life	  plans	  
premised	  on	  stable	  legal	  residence	  in	  a	  given	  state’s	  territory	  that	  entails	  the	  lapsing	  of	  a	  right	  of	  
return	  to	  the	  territory	  from	  which	  one,	  or	  one’s	  ancestors,	  were	  unjustly	  displaced.	  	  Rather,	  it	  may	  
require	  that	  individuals	  be	  fully	  integrated	  into	  the	  political	  people	  constituted	  by	  the	  state	  in	  which	  
they	  now	  reside,	  so	  that	  one	  comes	  to	  identify	  as	  a	  member	  of	  that	  people	  and	  to	  think	  of	  the	  
territory	  ruled	  by	  the	  state	  as	  “our	  territory.”	  	  This	  moves	  us	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  Miller’s	  nationalist	  
account	  of	  territorial	  rights.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
